Williams (1985, pp. 132-133) – after noting that differences of opinion should not be surprising – suggests that, in some contexts, agreement requires explanations and other disagreements. I don`t eat steak because I`m not sure of my own morals when it comes to steak food. It seems reasonable to me to imagine that cows are capable of experiencing pain, of fearing death. To be and to stop being. If you`re like the majority of people, eat steak. The proposals I have proposed do not seem reasonable to you. Attfield, Robin. 1979. As one is not a moral relativist The Monist 62: 510-523. Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Essence of Morality.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. But to say things this way is misleading. It is a question of establishing that the non-cooperator has in one way or another highlighted her position, without appealing to a contrast between, on the one hand, the assertions considered to be elusive and those which are not. Traditional non-cocognitivism understands this contrast and traditional non-cooperantists are therefore able to assert understandably that moral demands are among those for whom the truth is really not in question. They often explain, in a context of contrast, why moral affirmations mimic so well statements that might be true and why we might even say they are “true” in some sense (but not in the sense that statements that are well understood as cognitive) might be true. . . .
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